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INTRODUCTION
The transition process from communism in Eastern Europe
is probably the most important economic challenge in the last
twenty years. Some five years have elapsed since the political
events that started this process, and in a limited number of
countries (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the Baltic
Republics) transition seems to be heading towards success; in
others the prospects remain uncertain (as in Poland) or worri-
some (as in Russia). Indeed, as has been observed about the
Russian situation, the plausible possible futures for Russia
"range from an enticing vision of society A la Milton Friedman
to one more in the style of Stalin .... There is no end to incon-
gruous data about the main remnant of what used to be the
fatherland of socialism."'
A broad spectrum of transition attempts and results has
been documented;2 however, economists have yet to explain
convincingly these differences. For instance, according-to the
neoclassical view, transition towards a market economy comes
to a standstill because of the reluctance to liberalize prices and
the slow pace adopted in the privatization process. This leaves
agents without adequate signals because of the demise of
central planning and because the efficient relative-price system
is not yet in place. On the other hand, gradualists maintain
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'Adam Ulam, The Vision Thing, THE NEW REPUBLIc, June 20, 1994, at 40
(reviewing DANIEL YERGIN & THANE GUSTAFSON, RUSSIA 2010: AND WHAT IT
MEANS FOR THE WORLD (1994)).
2 For a general survey of the progress of economic reform in Poland,
Hungary, and The Czech and Slovak Federated Republic, see Robert L. Harris,
Coin' Down the Road Feeling Bad: U.S. Trade Laws' Discriminatory Treat-
ment of the East European Economies in Transition to Capitalism, 31 COLUM.
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that slow transition is inevitable and success is by no means
guaranteed; the present situation was thus to be expected and
foreign support becomes crucially important to drive the pro-
cess.3 Nevertheless, it remains unclear why price liberalization
in some countries has been easier than in others. One wonders
why some economies have been able to confront transition
problems through shock therapy, whereas policy makers who
have taken a gradualist stance have been frustrated in their
attempts.
All real "orthodox" explanations, including those derived
from the "new political economy,"4 are dependent upon the
behavior of exogenous and unpredictable variables: foreign aid,
higher aggregate demand in the so-called "West," and the
dynamic political situation, such as the resurgence of nationalist
sentiments and Cold War hostilities. Clearly the three pillars
of transition - privatization, price liberalization and currency
convertibility - are extremely fragile, if not meaningless, unless
they are realized within a suitable institutional/constitutional
framework.5
This paper develops a different approach to transition by
applying the principles of economic theory and public choice
analysis to the production of law and legislation. This theory
has been formalized elegantly6 and subjected to rigorous empiri-
s For a general discussion of the gradualist and neoclassical approaches
toward the privatization process in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, see
Stephen S. Cohen & Andrew Schwartz, The Tunnel at the End of the Light:
Privatization in Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNATL LAW. 7 (1994).
4 Cf Carlos Asilis & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, On the Political
Sustainability of Economic Reform at 2-3, IMF Doc. PPAA/94I3 (Jan. 1994)
(stating that this literature clearly cannot provide firm conclusions and a set
of policy recommendations guaranteed to ensure the sustainability and success
of reforms).
' The case of Russia, where privatization is a success only on paper, is
typical in this context. Cf Renzo Daviddi, Property Rights and Privatization,
in the Transition to a Market Economy. A Comparative Review, European
Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1994; and M. Boycko et al.,
Privatizing Russia (Brookings Institution, 1994).
6 The economic theory of regulation is based on the early seminal work in
public choice. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT (1962); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS
(1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); ;
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3 (1971); Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571,
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cal testing.7 It is, therefore, not surprising that the theory has
found virtually universal support among social scientists inter-
ested in the operation of the political process.'
Despite the growing importance of the public choice model
in economic theory, public choice methodology has yet to be
utilized to examine systematically the turmoil in Russia or the
former Soviet client-states.9 This article attempts to fill this
gap in the literature by analyzing the demise of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of the new Russian Federation using
a framework informed by the public choice paradigm.
Application of the principles of public choice to the recent
economic and constitutional reforms in Russia has important
practical and theoretical implications for public policy. On a
practical level, the analysis is important because it provides the
only systematic basis for predicting the future of the Russian
economy. It has been clear since at least 1989 that Gorbachev's
policy of perestroika was a failure and that neither communism
nor the Soviet Union would survive the demise of this political
program." It has also become clear over the past few years
that the promising economic and constitutional reforms initiated
by Russian President Boris Yeltsin are not guaranteed to
succeed." What remains unclear, however, is how far Russia
578 (1959).
7 See, e.g., ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLIsON, POLITICIANS,
LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY (1981); William F. Shughart III & Robert D.
Tollison, On the Growth of Government and the Political Economy of Legisla-
tion, 9 RES. L. & ECON. 111, 120-24 (1986); Ann P. Bartel & Lacy Glenn
Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's
Impact, 28 J.L. & Econ. 1, 4-10 (1985); B. Peter Pashigian, The Effect of
Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 6-7, 16-23 (1984); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureau-
cratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by -the
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 780-92 (1983); R. H. Coase,
Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979);
Howard P. Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretation of Early English
Experience, 20 J.L. & ECON. 379, 393-403 (1977); Thomas G. Moore, The
Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961).
I Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279 (1984).
9 We leave for future research the application of our framework to the
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and to the former Soviet
client-states in Eastern Europe.
10 Ulam, supra note 1, at 40.
"For a less than optimistic view of Russian reform, see Casper W.
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will move towards capitalist and democratic policies, and away
from the socialist and totalitarian policies that have dominated
its governmental institutions for decades. The implications of
this analysis for practical issues, ranging from the desirability
(and nature) of future Western aid, to the likely future of
nationalist sentiments, to the possibilities for a resurgence of
Cold War hostilities, are profound.
Analysis of events in Russia holds the promise of resolving
an important, albeit nascent, theoretical debate at the heart of
the public choice movement. As explained in this article, public
choice theory treats politics as a market in which politicians,
bureaucrats, manufacturers, consumers, and other groups act as
both demanders (through political support of all kinds) and
suppliers (through tax payments and compliance with regula-
tions for example) of legal rules. There is widespread consensus
among public choice scholars that special interest groups will
dominate the process of day-to-day political life.'2 This predic-
tion is quite robust for a variety of reasons, ranging from the
rational ignorance of consumers, to the existence of economies of
scope in organizing that permit certain organizations to galva-
nize into effective political coalitions to press for change.
Moreover, there is consensus among scholars of public choice
that these special interest groups will use their political advan-
tages to engage in rent-seeking. 3 Finally, there is general
consensus that rent-seeking is a negative-sum game 4 for soci-
Weinberger, Davos - and Russia, FORBES, Mar. 28, 1994, at 37; Rudi
Dornbusch, No Sense Throwing Good Money After Bad Rubles, BUS. WE., Feb.
7, 1994, at 18.
' The size of this phenomenon is significant. Estimates of the social costs
attributable to monopoly-inducing regulations range from about 3% of GNP in
developed countries, e.g. the United States, to well above 10% in Least
Developed Countries, e.g. in Turkey. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs
of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
13 Rent-seeking refers to the process of attempting to obtain economic
rents, which are payments for the use of economic capital (both human and
fixed) in excess of the market price through government intervention in the
market. A classic example of rent-seeking is an attempt by a single firm or
subset of firms to obtain a government monopoly in a particular market niche.
Such monopolies enable the firm or firms to raise prices above competitive
levels. The increased income from monopoly pricing is economic rent from
government regulation.
14 An important exception to this is provided by those instances where the
initial situation is already characterized by distortions, and the activity of the
rent-seekers is such that the final (second-best) outcome is closer to that
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ety, and that people therefore have an incentive to develop a
constitutional order in which they agree as a group to refrain
from engaging in rent-seeking - provided that others also re-
frain.
The theoretical deficiency in the public choice literature
results from the fact that the consensus about the desirability of
curbing rent-seeking is not matched by a concomitant consensus
about the bargaining conditions under which it will be possible
to do so. In other words, it is unclear under what conditions, if
any, it would be possible for consumers to overcome the
stranglehold of politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests,
and design political rules that serve their interests. 5 Implicit
in the work of many important scholars, such as James Buchan-
an,16  Richard Epstein, 17  Jerry Mashaw,5  and Cass
Sunstein, 9 is the core assumption that it is possible for citi-
zens to occupy a bargaining position from which a constitution
that reduces rent-seeking can be crafted. Other important
scholars, such as Mark Crain,20 William Landes, 21 Richard
typical of a distortion-free economy. See NEIL VOUSDEN, THE EcONOMICs OF
TRADE PROTECTION (1990) and Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al., DTJP Activities and
Economic Theory, 24 EUR. ECON. REV. 291, 297-99 (1984), for a formal
analysis of exogenous DUP (Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking) activities.
In this paper the analysis will, however, be limited to endogenous DUP.
In other words, it is assumed that interest groups attempt to create new rents,
rather than seize the benefit of existing rents.
" James Buchanan described the task of the constitutional political
economist as "assist[ingi individuals, as citizens who ultimately control their
own social order, in their continuing search for those rules of the political
game that will best serve their purposes, whatever these might be." James M.
Buchanan, The Constitution as Economic Policy, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONsTITUTIONAL ECONOMICs, 103, 113 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E.
Wagner eds., 1988).
16 See, e.g., id.; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6.
'7 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGs (1985); Richard A Epstein, An
Outline of Takings, 41 MIAMI L. REV. 3 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984); Richard
A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
-433 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Needed: Activist Judges for Economic Rights,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1985, at 32.
18 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward
a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980).
"9 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984).
20See, e.g., W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch in
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Posner,22 and Robert Tollison,23 take the view that the consti-
tution-making process will inevitably be dominated by special
interest groups, and this process merely presents additional
opportunities for politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests
to obtain wealth transfers at the expense of the public-at-large.
Analysis of the Russian constitutional and economic reform,
which is clearly constitutional in nature, presents a unique
opportunity to shed some light on this important debate within
the field of public choice.
This article develops two themes: first, events in Eastern
Europe can be better understood by applying public choice
principles; secondly, the future of the area is path-dependent;
that is, it has been determined by the bargaining dynamics that
initially caused the demise of the old regime and the emergence
of the new state. Section I examines the public choice literature
to determine what, if anything, the public choice model can
predict about the behavior of the relevant players and the likely
outcomes generated by their actions. Section II analyzes the
means by which organic constitutional change24 can evolve in
economies where rent-seeking is widely perceived as a signifi-
cant welfare-reducing phenomenon, even by successful rent-
seekers. Section III further develops this discussion by examin-
ing three different bargaining configurations. Section IV applies
the results obtained to the case of Russia, and it emphasizes the
crucial role played by the nomenklatura25 in the transition pro-
cess. The conclusions show that the future depends on whether
the post-Yeltsin constitutional moment is effectively underway
or is just a possibility. If the situation is the former, which is
the Interest-Group Theory of Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979)
[hereinafter Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch]; W. Mark Crain &
Robert D. Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest Group Perspective, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979) [hereinafter Crain & Tollison, Constitutional
Change].
21 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
22 See, e.g., id.
23 See, e.g., MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 7; Robert D. Tollison,
Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); Shughart & Tollison,
supra note 7.
24 "Organic constitutional change" refers to reform that involves change in
the essential laws organizing the government of a state.
' A member of the nomenklatura is an appointee. of the communist party
apparatus.
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contrary to common belief, hopes for rapid and sound improve-
ment are probably misplaced.
This article argues that the prospects for basic societal
change* are highest when the gap between the amount of wealth
generated by a rent-seeking society, and the amount of wealth
generated by a society that bars rent-seeking, are greatest. The
greater this gap, the greater the gains to politicians, bureau-
crats, interest groups, and consumers from curbing rent-seeking.
This conclusion, however, depends on the various parties' ability
to determine a mechanism by which the appropriate pay-offs
necessary to gain an efficient constitutional contract can be
made.
The article further argues that more effective organic
institutional reform in Russia will allow significant gains from
international trade. Germany and Japan, both of which re-
bounded almost miraculously from the post-war devastation of
their political and economic infrastructures, enjoy, as does
Russia, a well-educated, highly skilled labor force. Russia,
however, has a supply of natural resources, in addition to its
enviable supply of human capital, that far surpasses either
Japan or Germany. Thus, the gains to be realized from efficient
deployment of resources are staggering. The efficient deploy-
ment of resources, however, requires that the private sector
have decision-making authority over the allocation of capital.
The politicians, nomenklatura, and bureaucrats, who currently
control the allocation of resources in Russia, will demand a
heavy price for relinquishing this control.
I. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF LAW
This section discusses the economic theory of law as applied
to day-to-day political activities, then describes the organic
institutional change occurring in Russia.
A. ECONOMICS AND THE PRODUCTION OF LEGAL RULES
Under the economic (or "interest group") theory of law,
"legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other
goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that
derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social
welfare."26 In other words, the economic theory of regulation
6 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
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applies generally accepted principles of rational economic
behavior to decisions made by politicians, bureaucrats, and
interest groups.
The economic theory of lawmaking has predictive implica-
tions starkly different from the traditional, public interest
theory of regulation. The latter theory holds that regulations
are designed to benefit the public by solving collective action
problems and other types of market failures. By contrast, the
economic theory of regulation holds that public decision-makers
(politicians and bureaucrats) behave as do private-sector con-
sumers and businesses; they attempt to maximize their own
self-interest, generally at the expense of overall societal welfare.
Under the economic theory of lawmaking, interested parties
form distributional coalitions in order to trade resources - in
the form of power and influence, as well as money - for legisla-
tion that provides private benefits to the members of the
distributional coalitions. The theory focuses on the differing
organizational costs that face rival political coalitions. Efficien-
cy considerations indicate that a group forms into an effective
political coalition when the benefits from achieving wealth
transfers from the legislature outweigh the costs of organizing.
For a number of reasons, some groups are able to organize into
distributional coalitions more cheaply than others."
In particular, groups that have already formed into deci-
sion-making coalitions for exogenous reasons - such as lawyers
and elderly people in the United States, and the military and
nomenklatura in Russia - find the small marginal costs of
diverting their activities to the political arena far outweighed by
the benefits from the favorable legislation procured. The eco-
nomic theory of regulation recognizes that well-organized special
interest groups are better able to provide the political support
that politicians need to survive than are highly diffuse, disorga-
nized citizens. Consequently, politicians unable or unwilling to
satisfy interest group constituents are driven from office by rival
politicians more capable of supplying the laws that interest
groups demand.
A simple example illustrates this point: Suppose a proposed
piece of legislation would cost every person in Russia the ruble
equivalent of U.S. $2.00 and would transfer $250 million to a
the Constitution, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
27 MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 7, at 16-18; MANCUR OLSON, THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 17-35 (1982).
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particular interest group. The individual members of the public
who paid for this legislation through an additional tax of $2.00
(or, more likely, their pro-rata share of the interest on an
additional $500 million of governmental borrowing, or their pro-
rata share of society's cost of conforming to some new, cumber-
some government regulation designed to erect barriers to entry
or to cartelize an industry)" would not find it in their interest
to organize into an effective political coalition to oppose this
wealth transfer. This is because the costs of organizing will be
many times greater than the $2.00 per capita cost of the legisla-
tion. Individual citizens not only would incur the costs of
organizing, they would also bear the costs of obtaining informa-
tion about the merits of the proposed legislation. Consequently,
it would be rational for most individuals to remain ignorant
about the effects of the proposed transfer rather than to incur
the information and organizational costs necessary to effectively
qppose the proposed wealth transfers. By contrast, the interest
group beneficiary of the regulation would have incentives to
expend resources up to the full amount of the proposed wealth
transfer in order to achieve passage of the legislation effectuat-
ing the transfer. In the end, the lawmaking process is viewed
as a market in which legal rules go to the individual or group
-that values them the most, as measured by its willingness and
ability to pay.
Although qualifications are sometimes required, a useful
generalization is that the economic theory of regulation posits
that legislation will be characterized by concentrated benefits
for discrete groups and widely disbursed social costs. This is
because legislatures pass laws benefitting those groups able to
trade political support or money in exchange for obtaining their
passage. 9 The cost of legislation is, of course, borne by those
in the worst position to object to their passage - the amorphous
' It costs more than $250 million to consummate a $250 million wealth
transfer to an interest group because the transfer does not take the form of a
direct subsidy. Rather, the transfer is effectuated by the formation of a large,
cumbersome bureaucratic framework that wastes significant resources
carrying out the wealth transfer.
' Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,224
(1986) ("[M]arket forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws
that serve private rather than public interests, and hence statutes are
.supplied by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that outbid
competing groups.").
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and disaggregated public. Moreover, the realities of the political
marketplace provide strong incentives for politicians themselves
to search actively for issues where winners are easily identified
and losers are poorly identified.
The losers pay for legislation benefitting special interest
groups with increased regulatory burdens at all levels and
higher prices for goods and services.30 These losers are consid-
ered incapable of fighting back for several possible reasons:
first, "clever" losers might believe that any "new" politicians
they elected would behave in the same way as the previous
ones, even if the favored coalition were no longer the same;3
secondly, "ignorant" losers might not realize that they were
cheated and that their welfare was falling (this is often the cage
with protectionism); or, finally, decision-makers at the center of
the decision-making process are bureaucrats who are not easily
removed.
Thus, the outcome of the political market is usually a
negative-sum game. It wastes economic resources because
groups expend resources organizing into effective political
coalitions, sponsoring opponents of unsympathetic politicians,
sanctioning non-cooperative group members, and resisting the
rent-seeking activities of rival groups. If successful, rent-seek-
ing leads to distortions. If the outcome is uncertain, the proba-
bility of successful rent-seeking reduces economic incentives to
engage in productive economic activity because investors face
the risk that their investments will be damaged by government
regulation.
The above discussion examines the process of rent-seeking
by interest groups during times of ordinary politics. The follow-
ing discussion examines public choice theory during times of
organic, constitutional change of the kind that has been taking
place in Eastern Europe over the past several years. Unfortu-
30 Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of
the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L.
REV. 471, 478-80 (1988).
31 A clever loser understands that no politician will ever pay attention to
him, either because the loser's group has only negligible voting power or
because the politician can extract only modest resources from the loser's rent-
seeking activities. Thus, the loser accepts successful rent-seeking by strong
interest groups and he aims at keeping the "ruling class" in office. With this
strategy, the amount of unproductive, rent-seeking activities is likely to be
smaller because the activities tend to be an increasing function of the turnover
in the bureaucratic and the political classes.
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nately, here the public choice model becomes less a paradigm
than a pair of competing hypotheses.
One hypothesis is that constitution-making is no different
than ordinary lawmaking. This posits that rent-seeking domi-
nates both types of lawmaking; that constitutional change is
simply a high stakes variant of ordinary lawmaking.
The competing hypothesis is that the incentives facing the
interest groups and individuals drafting constitutional rules are
fundamentally different than those they face during times of
ordinary lawmaking. As a result of these new incentives,
-constitutions will likely be far more restrictive than ordinary
laws in the degree of freedom afforded to interest-group politics.
-Both of these hypotheses are possible. Sometimes constitu-
tion-making is indistinguishable from ordinary lawmaking.
Where this happens, the ultimate political equilibrium that
emerges from the constitution-making process will enhance,
rather than inhibit, the rent-seeking process because the consti-
tution-making process will be designed to increase returns to
the politicians who control the process. Alternatively, the
ultimate political equilibrium that emerges from the constitu-
tion-making process may inhibit rent-seeking. Predicting the
constitutional framework emerging from any particular constitu-
tional debate will depend on whose voices are heard at the
bargaining table.
B. THE ECONOMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Thus, with regard to periods of organic constitutional
change, the public choice model becomes less a paradigm than
a set of competing hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis,
organic constitutional change is a high stakes variant of politics
as usual. As Robert Tollison put it, "[c]onstitutional provisions
are worth more than normal legislation to interest groups
because they are more durable (i.e., harder to repeal), but they
are also more costly to obtain because of stricter procedures
required for passage."32 According to this view, the advantage
of constitutional rules is that they address the severe bargain-
ing problem that results from non-simultaneity of performance
between politicians and interest groups attempting to strike
mutually beneficial deals.
32 Tollison, supra note 23, at 346.
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This non-simultaneity of performance problem exists be-
cause the payment for a particular political favor (in the form of
bribes, political support, etc.) must often be made before a
politician will be called upon to deliver his end of the bargain
(i.e., sponsoring a piece of legislation that cartelizes a market
for a particular producer or procuring a contract with the
government that cartelizes a market). When this happens, the
non-simultaneity of performance between the politician and the
interest group can lead to post-contractual opportunism where
the politician reneges on the deal, either by refusing to perform
when asked or by demanding additional payments later. This,
in turn, makes the interest group less willing to supply political
support in exchange for legislation in the first place.
The non-simultaneity of performance problem facing inter-
est groups and politicians is particularly acute because the
passage of the legislation in period one gives interest groups
harmed by its initial passage the incentive to galvanize into an
effective political coalition to fight for its repeal in period two.
The spectre of an escalating cycle of rent-seeking, due to the
inability of politicians to "stay bought," makes interest groups
less willing to pay politicians in order to obtain wealth transfers
in the first place.
Crain and Tollison 3 and Landes and Posner3 ' have ar-
gued that constitutional enactments that make interest-group
legislation more difficult to repeal can solve this non-simultane-
ity of performance problem. For example, the executive veto, by
making it more difficult to repeal a law once it is enacted,
increases the durability of legislation and thereby helps to solve
the non-simultaneity of performance problem. Similarly,
Landes and Posner argue that an independent judiciary facili-
tates interactions between interest groups and politicians
because it prevents interest group bargains from being thwarted
by subsequent legislatures:
The element of stability or continuity necessary to
enable interest-group politics to operate in the legisla-
tive arena is supplied in the first instance, by the
procedural rules of the legislature, and in the second
Crain & Tolison, The Executive Branch, supra note 20, at 560.
4 Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 892-94.
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instance, by the existence of an independent judicia-
ry
35
Under this variant theory, major organic changes in consti-
tutional structure will occur in order to improve contracting
problems that exist between politicians and interest groups. We
will call this the "politics-as-usual" theory of constitutional
change. This theory predicts that life will be worse for ordinary
citizens after a period of constitutional change because interest
groups and politicians will find it less costly to make agree-
ments that transfer wealth to themselves.
However, there is a critical analytical flaw in the politics-as-
usual strain of public choice theory. The executive veto and the
independent judiciary - the elements identified as facilitating
interest group politics by lowering the costs of rent-seeking -
are elements that can, in fact, raise the costs of rent-seeking.
As Buchanan and Tullock observed, these institutional features
of constitutional structure raise the decision-costs of government
and thus make rent-seeking more difficult by increasing the
number of entities (judges, presidents, as well as legislators)
that must be "bought off' in order to achieve passage of an
interest group wealth transfer. 6 Moreover, in the case of the
politically independent judges who comprise the judiciary, the
politics-as-usual strain of public choice fails to supply any
reason why these actors would enforce, rather than overturn,
the interest group bargains struck in the legislature. For
example, in the case of the President, the politics-as-usual
strain of analysis does not explain why the President does not
extract additional political support for himself from interest
groups with a national base in exchange for his agreement to
decline to veto a particular statute. If the executive does extract
additional political support from interest groups (as public
choice theory says he must in order to stay in office), then the
presence of the executive veto as part of a constitutional govern-
ment characterized by separation of powers raises, rather than
lowers, the cost to interest groups of achieving passage of
special interest legislation.
The point here is not that the politics-as-usual theory of
constitutional design is wrong. Rather, we fully acknowledge
the possibility of organic constitutional change that enhances,
Id. at 878.
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 233-48.
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rather than diminishes, the efficacy of rent-seeking. Our point
is simply that the politics-as-usual form of constitutional change
will not be characterized by a move to a constitutional regime of
separated powers with a truly independent judiciary and an
independently elected executive with veto powers. Rather, as
discussed below, such a regime is likely to be characterized by
the dominance and control of one branch of government over its
rival branches. Constitutional change that enshrines this type
of revision into a nation's governmental structure, such as by
creating a powerful executive that maintains political control
over the legislature and judiciary, will lower the costs to inter-
est groups of striking bargains with politicians.
However, the dismal results produced by the process of
constitution-making described above are not the only possible
outcomes from the process of constitutional reform. Happier
results are possible because groups have incentives to curb rent-
seeking during periods of constitutional change because rent-
seeking is a negative-sum game - there will be more losers
than winners from the process. During times of ordinary
politics, all groups are in a classic prisoner's dilemma. Although
everyone would be better off if a credible, enforceable agreement
to prevent rent-seeking could be constructed, individual interest
groups can profit if they engage in rent-seeking, provided others
do not, in the absence of such an agreement. Similarly, in the
-absence of an agreement to restrict rent-seeking, the worst
possible outcome for any individual or group would be to refrain
from engaging in rent-seeking while other groups are rent-
seeking. The individual or group refraining from rent-seeking
would find itself subjected to numerous taxes and regulations
designed to benefit other groups at its expense. Thus, rent-
seeking is a classic prisoner's dilemma because all groups must
engage in this activity, both in order to avoid the worst possible
private outcome - massive rent-seeking at its expense - and
to have the possibility of enjoying the best possible public out-
come - massive governmental wealth transfers obtained with-
out resistance from other groups.
To depict the game-theoretic aspect of rent-seeking graphi-
cally, suppose that each person in society has the choice be-
tween pursuing a strategy of seeking wealth transfers in the
legislature through rent-seeking and pursuing a strategy of
creating wealth by engaging in consensual, marketplace trans-
actions. The decision to pursue one of these strategies, rather
than the other, will depend on the incentives created by the
constitutional structure. The decision to trade in the market-
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place produces mutual gains from trade, while the decision to
engage in rent-seeking retards growth and diminishes wealth.
Imagine the following hypothetical payoffs in a game with two
players, A and B. If neither A nor B engage in rent-seeking, but
instead restrict themselves to marketplace activities, each will
have a net wealth of 200. Alternatively, if both engage in rent-
seeking, each will have a net wealth of 50. However, if A
engages in rent-seeking and B does not, A will be able to garner
a net wealth of 300, while B's wealth, which is diminished by
A's rent-seeking, will be reduced to 30. Similarly, if B engages
in rent-seeking and A does not, B Will be able to garner a net
wealth of 300, while A, (whose wealth is diminished by B's rent-
seeking, just as B's was reduced by A's rent-seeking) will be
reduced in wealth to 30.3
7
As long as the relevant individuals and groups within a
society recognize that rent-seeking is a negative-sum game they
will have incentives to solve the prisoner's dilemma posed by
the possibility of rent-seeking during times of ordinary politics
by drafting credible, sustainable constitutional rules that re-
strict the level of rent-seeking during times of ordinary politics:
Clearly, people have an incentive to develop a constitu-
tional order whereby they agree to abide by the rules of
trade and to refrain from plunder. A constitutional
contract provides a possible escape from the prisoners'
dilemma in which the members of society are otherwise
caught. In effect, constitutional order is a mutually
advantageous treaty among what would otherwise be
warring factions - a treaty which promotes the substi-
tution of wealth-creating trade from wealth-reducing
[i.e., rent-seeking] plunder.38
37





3 8James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and Consti-
tutional Order, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 29, 33
(James D. Gwartney and Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988).
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The above discussion used a bargaining model to describe
the way that constitutions are likely to be shaped during times
of constitutional change. Bargaining, of course, is most likely to
occur when the gains from trade are highest; these gains from
trade will be highest in countries where low or stagnant eco-
nomic growth is coupled with high potential for growth. Under
these conditions consumers can provide bureaucrats with the
highest returns for acquiescing to a new constitutional order.
For example, in the numerical prisoner's dilemma presented
above, the market participants' joint wealth if they refrain from
rent-seeking is 400, while their joint wealth if they engage in
rent-seeking is 100, producing gains from trade of 300. As this
difference increases, the gains from producing a constitution
that restricts rent-seeking also increases. Russia is rich in
natural resources and has a highly educated and technically
skilled workforce endowed with a strong work ethic. This
strongly implies massive potential gains from trade for produc-
ing a constitution that curbs rent-seeking.
In a nutshell, because rent-seeking is a negative-sum game,
there are gains from trade to be realized by blocking this activi-
ty. There is little disagreement about this theoretical point.
Thus the critical question is not whether people have incentives
to design constitutional barriers to rent-seeking, but instead
whether people can overcome the contracting problems that
make it difficult to do so.
II. TOWARDS A RENT-SEEKING TAXONOMY
In the preceding section we described the economic theory
of law and the phenomenon of rent-seeking that results from
rational economic actors turning their attention from markets to
politics. Public choice theory predicts that constitutional cre-
ation may cause either an increase in aggregate levels of rent-
seeking within a society or a decrease in such rent-seeking.
Where interest groups and politicians collude in order to reduce
the transaction costs of effectuating wealth transfers, organic
constitutional changes within a society likely will result in
increased aggregate levels of rent-seeking during the post-
constitutional period. This, in turn, will reduce economic output
-and retard economic development because the prospect of rent-
seeking reduces incentives to invest.
Alternatively, if interest groups resolve the prisoner's
dilemma that forces them into rent-seeking during times of
ordinary politics, they will induce organic constitutional change
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that increases the transaction costs of effectuating wealth
transfers and deprives politicians of power. Likely results from
this latter set of conditions are reductions in aggregate levels of
rent-seeking during the post-constitutional period, increases in
investment incentives, and an increase in aggregate economic
output.
In this section we explore how organic constitutional change
affects rent-seeking. Our methodology bears similarities to the
thought experiment developed by John Rawls39 in which he
posits a set of shared values and attempts to develop rules for
a just world. Critical to the Rawlsian analysis is the notion that
the bargaining parties must be aware of basic facts about the
world that are relevant to their moral judgments. For this
purpose, Rawls introduces the concept of a "veil of ignorance"
that is used to conceal from the parties facts that might distort
their moral judgments and that, in any case, are (or should be)
irrelevant to those judgments.
Following Rawls, the information possessed by the parties
is critical to our analysis. However, unlike Rawls, we do not
have the luxury of assuming away knowledge about facts that
might influence the parties' judgments in self-interested ways.
In our framework, we posit that interest groups are aware of
the costs and benefits of post-constitutional rent-seeking.
Therefore incentives to design constitutions that deter rent-
seeking clearly exist, even though there are high levels of rent-
seeking during' times of ordinary politics. This is consistent
with observed reality: ordinary citizens constantly are com-
plaining about organized interest groups and powerful
distributional coalitions, even though they join groups and
distributional coalitions that further their own interests. °
Somewhat more controversially, perhaps, we also posit that
.the relevant interest groups have the technical ability to craft a
constitution that reduces the efficacy of rent-seeking by increas-
ing the transaction costs associated with such behavior.41 As
Buchanan and Tullock demonstrated in The Calculus of Con-
sent, different organizational structures inevitably lead to
89 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTicE (1971).
4 Jonathan Rauch, The Hyperpluralism Trap, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June
6, 1994, at 22-24.
41 For a more complete discussion of the various types of constitutional
provisions that can reduce rent-seeking by raising the transaction costs of
organizing distributional coalitions, see Macey, supra note 30, at 478-80.
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different supply curves for legislation.42 In other words, consti-
tutions can create organizational structures that provide a
means to effectively constrain rent-seeking. Indeed, the field of
-constitutional economics is largely devoted to the subject of how
constitutions can restrict the supply of legislation.
Six organizational structures of a constitution that clearly
raise the transaction costs of rent-seeking are: (1) the use of a
bicameral legislature in which each house varies in size and
constituency; (2) a central bank that is free of political influence;
(3) an independent judiciary; (4) an executive (preferably line-
item) veto; (5) a robust federal system; and (6) a provision
requiring a balanced budget.
A. THE BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE
Building on the work of Buchanan and Tullock, McCormick
and Tollison demonstrated empirically that special interest
groups will fare better in the market for legislation where
legislators are distributed equally between the two houses of a
bicameral legislature.' Thus, a constitution designed to curb
rent-seeking would have a bicameral legislature of two houses
with widely unequal distributions in membership.
Similarly, as Buchanan and Tullock show, where the mem-
bers of each house of a bicameral legislature represent different
'constituencies, and where the two houses must concur to pass a
law, it is more difficult for interest groups to ensure the passage
of legislation that furthers their interests. This is because the
costs to the interest groups of persuading the different political
constituencies to support their interests increases as the politi-
cal constituencies that must be compensated for new legislation
increases. Thus, a constitution intended to impede rent-seeking
would have a bicameral legislature in which different selection
criteria would be used for the selection of membership in each
house.
B. THE INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK
In the absence of an independent central bank, politicians
can attract payoffs by manipulating monetary policy in order to
transfer wealth among competing interest groups. For example,
42 BUCHANAN & TuLLocK, supra note 6, at 119-262.
43 MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 7.
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by causing the nation's currency to inflate at higher than
expected rates, politicians can transfer wealth from creditors to
debtors by enabling debtors to repay loans with currency of
lower value than anticipated. Similarly, by keeping inflation
below expected levels, politicians transfer wealth from debtors
to creditors by enabling creditors to collect loans in currency of
higher value than anticipated. Thus, by creating an indepen-
dent central bank, a society can limit avenues of rent-seeking
and promote economic growth and development.
C. THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The power of judicial review by an independent judiciary
can impose significant restraints on the efficacy of interest
groups. This structural constitutional feature enables the
judicial branch to raise firther the cost to interest groups of
obtaining favorable legislation by lowering the probability that
interest group bargains enacted by the legislature will be
upheld in the future.
D. THE ExEcuTivE VETO
The executive veto raises the decision costs of government
and thereby lowers the efficacy of rent-seeking by broadening
the scope of the consensus that interest groups must achieve in
.order to obtain passage of legislation they prefer. In addition,
while it is true that both legislators and chief executives are
popularly elected, because chief executives' electoral constituen-
cies are national in scope, they are likely to take a broader view
of relevant issues, than are legislators. As Terry Moe and Scott
Wilson observed, "[u]nlike legislators, presidents are held
responsible for virtually every aspect of national perfor-
mance"4" and, therefore, have an institutional preference for
effective governance.45
E. THE ROBUST FEDERAL SYSTEM
Federalism acts as a significant check on governmental
excess by offering to citizens rival governmental frameworks. If
4 Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Stracture,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 23 (1994).
45 Id. at 12.
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citizens perceive that rent-seeking is too prevalent at one level
of government, they may exercise their "exit option" and opt for
more localized governmental power. The threat of such an exit
from the federal system serves as a check on government
legislators and bureaucrats who tend to be highly averse to
losing power. Thus, a robust federal system acts as a restraint
on the ability of interest groups to influence government and
effectuate wealth transfers. Douglass North observed that the
closer the substitutes for an existing governmental scheme, "the
fewer degrees of freedom the ruler possesses, and the greater
the percentage of incremental income that will be retained by
the constituents."46
F. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED BALANCED BUDGET
Government can constrain rent-seeking by imposing a
constitutional requirement that the government refrain from
deficit financing. Such a requirement would facilitate resolution
of the collective action and rational ignorance problems that face
consumers during times of ordinary politics. Bureaucrats and
interest groups use deficit financing both to increase aggregate
levels of wealth transfers to interest groups and to disguise the
true costs and benefits of their legislative enactments. They
accomplish this by shifting the payments to the future, thus
raising the amount of information ordinary citizens must ac-
quire before they find it worthwhile to form into effective politi-
cal coalitions to oppose rent-seeking. By requiring a balanced
budget the disadvantages suffered by ordinary citizens in their
efforts to galvanize into effective political coalitions to oppose
rent-seeking can be significantly reduced.
III. SOME BARGAINING CONFIGURATIONS
Even under the twin assumptions (knowledge about the
effects of rent-seeking coupled with the technological ability to
design constitutional structures to curtail rent-seeking) adopted
under the bargaining framework presented in this article, it is
still not inevitable that the relevant parties will agree to a
constitutional regime that curbs rent-seeking. Rather, the
outcome of the bargaining that occurs during the formulation of
46 Douglass C. North, A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic
History, 16 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 249, 253 (1979).
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constitutional rules will depend on the preferences and expecta-
tions of the bargaining parties, which, in turn, will depend on
their expectations about the post-constitutional world. More-
over, a host of bargaining problems may prevent the parties
from reaching an agreement despite the existence of significant
potential gains from trade.
The participants in the constitutional bargaining game are
involved in real-world social contracting. Unlike the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance,4' behind which the bargaining parties are
assumed to be ignorant of their status in the post-bargaining
world, the individuals and groups will be fully aware of their
likely roles in a post-constitutional order. Critical to this
analysis is the possibility that some groups will expect to be net
winners in a rent-seeking society. This is due to the fact that,
even though rent-seeking is a negative-sum game overall, for
some individuals and groups (for example, politicians, bureau-
crats, lawyers, lobbyists, and the nomenklatura) rent-seeking is
clearly a positive-sum exercise. The ability of successful rent-
seekers to peek behind the constitutional-stage bargaining veil
to get a view of their role in the constitutional order will cause
them vigorously to resist efforts to forge constitutional rules
that eliminate the demand for their services by reducing aggre-
gate levels of rent-seeking.
Thus, the identity of the groups actively involved in deter-
ing governmental structure and allocations of power during
times of organic constitutional change will be critical to the
outcomes generated by the bargaining process. There are three
possible bargaining configurations, each of which leads to
varying results in terms of overall social welfare.
A. CONSUMER CONTROL OF THE PROCESS:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT
One possible bargaining configuration is that the net losers
from rent-seeking (for ease of exposition we will call these net
losers "consumers") will exclude the net winners (for ease of
exposition we will call the net winners from rent-seeking "bu-
reaucrats") from the bargaining table or else they will eliminate
their influence once they are there. Where this occurs, the
consumers will design constitutional rules that structurally
impede rent-seeking. This will lead to strong incentives to
' RAWLS, supra note 39.
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invest in productive activities because entrepreneurs will no
longer have to worry about the spectre of governmental expro-
priation of their investments. This, in turn, will lead to high
levels of economic growth and prosperity.
At first blush it might seem unlikely that consumers will be
able to exclude bureaucrats from the bargaining table. After all,
it is the bureaucrats who control governmental decision-making
during times of ordinary politics, and it stands to reason that
such bureaucrats will influence, if not control, the public deci-
sion-making process during times of organic constitutional
change. However, it must be remembered that consumers have
strong incentives to develop a constitutional order that limits
rent-seeking.
Rational ignorance deprives consumers of the incentive to
galvanize into effective political coalitions to oppose statutes
passed during the course of everyday politics because the trans-
action costs of forming such coalitions outweigh the benefits in
the form of savings from wealth transfers. However, this cost-
benefit calculation changes when organic constitutional rules
are being considered. This is because the impact of constitution-
al rules is much higher than the impact of ordinary laws be-
cause such rules will determine the ability of government to
affect all of a citizen's present and future wealth. Thus
we would expect the citizen-consumer-taxpayer to play
a larger role in constitutional processes than in normal
political processes ... [because] the individual voter's
stake is ... larger when considering constitutional
issues. At the relevant margins of behavior, then, we
expect more voter impact on constitutions than on
regular elections.48
Consumers may therefore be able to galvanize into an effective
political coalition and freeze the bureaucrats out of the process.
Constitutional moments are the periods in which consumers
overcome the free-rider and rational ignorance problems, result-
ing in the prisoner's dilemma of ordinary politics, in order to
craft constitutional rules that impede rent-seeking.49 The
defining characteristic of a constitutional moment is that it
represents an agreement among people to restrict their rent-
4 8 MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 7, at 127.
41 See BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 270-72 (1991).
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seeking activities in exchange for an agreement by others to do
the same.5"
B. BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OF THE PROCESS:
POLITICS AS USUAL
Just as consumers have incentives to initiate and to gain
control of the process of constitutional formation in order to
make themselves better off at the expense of bureaucrats, so too
do bureaucrats have incentives to initiate and to gain control of
the process of constitutional formation in order to make them-
selves better off at the expense of consumers. To achieve this
end, the bureaucrats will attempt either to exclude the consum-
ers from the bargaining table or to ignore their interests once
they are there.
The bureaucrats can benefit from constitutional change to
the extent they are able to design organizational rules that
solve the contracting problems that exist between politicians
and rent-seekers. By doing this the bureaucrats can increase
the demand for their services. Bureaucrats act as brokers
among consumers and various groups of producers; they "estab-
lish an equilibrium" by efficiently pairing these demanders and
suppliers of legislation.51 From the bureaucrats' perspective,
constitutional rules differ from ordinary rules only with respect
to their durability. The greater durability of constitutional rules
makes them more valuable to special interest groups.
For this reason, politicians will press for constitutional
changes that increase the durability of special interest legisla-
tion and solve the non-simultaneity problems that exist between
politicians and rent-seekers in order to increase the demand for
their services.5" The bureaucrats will attempt to exclude the
.consumers from the process of constitutional change because the
interests of the consumers are diametrically opposed to those of
the bureaucrats.
5o See id.
I1 1d. at 62.
6 Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change, supra note 20, at 165, 167;
Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 888-91.
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C. THE BARGAINING GAME
The final possibility is that neither the bureaucrats nor the
consumers are able to exclude the other or to ignore the others'
influence. In this case, each group will have to take the inter-
ests of the other into account. In particular, the bureaucrats,
who expect to lose from reductions in rent-seeking, may be able
to form a blocking coalition to impede consumers from reaching
a welfare-increasing (on aggregate) constitutional change. This
results because organic societal changes often require the
support of a super-majority. Side payments from consumers to
bureaucrats are a possible solution. Their feasibility, however,
is greatly reduced by their likely size, as well as by the exis-
tence of severe bargaining problems, particularly the non-
simultaneity of performance and social problems.
With regard to non-simultaneity, the trade gains from
setting constitutional rules to impede rent-seeking are future
gains to be realized from increases in productivity and aggre-
gate social wealth. Consequently, bureaucrats will be asked to
make immediate sacrifices by accepting constitutional impedi-
ments to rent-seeking and power cuts in exchange for promises
of future compensation from consumers. Such compensation
would, however, become more difficult to enforce in the new
post-constitutional order. In addition, side payments to the
bureaucrats would, of course, be illegal: in principle, civil
servants are supposed to act in the best interests of society.
Bureaucrats would actually endanger their power base by
accepting explicit payments.
The contracting problems are exacerbated by the fact that
the restrictions on rent-seeking behavior that consumers bar-
gain to obtain will necessarily require constitutional measures
that reduce the power of the bureaucrats. These restrictions
will reduce the bureaucrats' power to enforce promises made by
consumers in the post-constitutional order.
In addition to simultaneity of performance problems, there
are also likely to be significant social obstacles to contracting.
The bureaucrats' claims to power derive from a complex combi-
nation of control over police and military power and public
support. Public support derives from the bureaucrats' ability to
claim to be acting in the best interests of society. The sheer size
of the side payments necessary to induce the bureaucrats to
acquiesce in the consumers' efforts to design a constitution that
impedes rent-seeking is potentially so large that bureaucrats
would endanger their power base by accepting such payments.
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The acceptance of such payments would not only amount to an
admission that the bureaucrats were interested in advancing
only their own personal welfare, and not the welfare of the
public they ostensibly were hired to serve; they would also be
illegal. The public would take the position that such side-
payments belonged to them, rather than to the bureaucrats.
The likely mechanism for solving these contracting prob-
lems is to keep the bureaucrats in office in exchange for their
agreement to refrain from interfering with the consumers'
activities in the market. Keeping the bureaucrats in office
allows them to keep politicians at bay in ordinary decision-
making.
D. BEYOND BARGAINING
In a path-breaking book, Mancur Olson posits a non-bar-
gaining alternative mechanism by which a society can free itself
from the welfare-reducing distributional coalitions.53 Consis-
tent with the analysis presented here, Olson begins with the as-
sumption that interest groups forming distributional coalitions
have powerful incentives to seek a larger share of the national
income, even when this rent-seeking "greatly reduces social
output."'54 Similarly, Olson recognizes the fact that interest
groups' rent-seeking "reduces an economy's dynamism and rate
of growth,"55 and that interest groups "increase regulation,
bureaucracy, and political interventions in markets."56
While Olson recognizes that constitutional rules can present
obstacles to passage of special-interest legislation," he does
not specify the conditions .under which a country is likely to
adopt a constitution that impedes rent-seeking. Instead, Olson
posits an alternative mechanism by which distributional coali-
tions can be displaced:
[C]ountries whose distributional coalitions have been
emasculated or abolished by totalitarian government or
foreign occupation should grow relatively quickly after




517 Id. at 90 (citing Switzerland as a country with a constitution that
presents obstacles to special interest legislation).
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a free and stable legal order is established. This can
explain the postwar "economic miracles" in the nations
that were defeated in World War II, particularly those
in Japan and West Germany. The everyday use of the
word miracle to describe the rapid economic growth in
these countries testifies that this growth is not only
unexpected but outside the range of known laws and
experience.5 8
Thus it stands to reason that if the above assumptions (knowl-
edge about the effects of rent-seeking coupled with the techno-
logical ability to design constitutional structures to curtail rent-
seeking) obtain, consumers who are unable to reach an agree-
ment with bureaucrats will have strong incentives to foster
revolution in order to undermine the continued stability of the
dominant distributional coalitions that are undermining their
society's potential for growth.
IV. RUSSIA: THE BARGAINING MODEL ALTERNATIVES
Unfortunately, it is not possible to apply Mancur Olson's
paradigm to the Russian experience because there has been no
abolition of that country's distributional coalitions by totalitari-
an government or foreign occupation. Olson's approach has
indeed been at the basis of the shock-therapy approach to
privatization in the Czech Republic and in Poland. However,
the very need to emasculate or brainwash the bureaucracy, as
was to some extent the case, for example, in Poland, explains
why gradualism is still the leitmotiv in the former U.S.S.R. In
the former U.S.S.R., most, if not all, of the country's basic
distributional coalitions remain in place. Enterprises escaped
from central planning into an endless series of negotiations with
the bureaucracy over subsidies, prices, and output, rather than
into a true market environment. Thus, this section of the article
explores the implications of the bargaining analysis as it applies
to Russia.
Despite the fact that Russia has human and natural re-
sources that far surpass those of Germany and Japan, the two
nations that advanced from ruin to the status of economic
superpowers in fifteen years, 9 the fall of the Soviet empire has
58 Id. at 75-76.
59 Ulam, supra note 1, at 40.
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not brought prosperity. Instead, gross domestic product (GDP)
is at least one-third smaller than it was in 1985, and inflation
is not yet under control.60
Ironically, Russia's problem is precisely that it has not
suffered a major military defeat or an equivalent shock. The
dominant interest groups, particularly the apparatchiks and
members of the economic bureaucracy, remain in place,6' "un-
willing to carry out the transition process, which would mean
- the loss of power and privileges. 62 The actions of the Russian
parliament, which opposed and obstructed economic reform
whenever possible, provide ample evidence of the problems for
meaningful reform. Even with the ratification of the new
constitution and the election of an entirely new legislature in
December of 1993, conservatives and communists continue to
dominate the government and hinder meaningful reform.63
Thus in Russia, even though the ideology of the communists
was discredited, the interest groups and bureaucrats that
,thrived under communist rule continue to control the country's
resources. These bureaucrats and interest groups hold reform
hostage.
A. A CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT FOR RussiA?
In terms of the bargaining model presented above, clearly
the first possibility, which posits consumer control of the process
with bureaucrats and interest groups agreeing to rules that curb
rent-seeking, has not taken place. The recent constitutional
reform failed to lead to any substantial reduction in the power
and influence of the bureaucracy over the Russian economy.
The new constitution preserves the old bureaucracy almost
intact under the title "The Government of the Russian Federa-
tion." This branch of the Russian government is currently led
.by the Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. Chernomyrdin, a
self-described "red manager," is a former apparatchik from the
60 Id.
61 Historically, an apparatchik works within the bureaucratic apparatus of
the communist party.
6 2 Enrico Colombatto, The Integration of the East and the Options for the
West, 3 JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 273, 275 (1992).
' See Peter Galusska & Patricia Kanz, Crunch Time in Russia, BUS. WY-,
Feb. 7, 1994, at 42; Yuri N. Afanasyev, Russia's Vicious Circle, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1994, at A17.
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mammoth Russian natural gas enterprise.' Judging from his
past, he clearly seems averse to reform, and his cabinet is filled
with like-minded men.65 According to a recent Newsweek
article, "[t]he new government .. .is packed with Soviet-style
bosses: a former factory director, a collective-farm director, a
central-bank chief who believes in state subsidies for industry
.... They are.., men for whom support of Russia's inefficient
industry and agriculture is second nature."66 Under this ar-
rangement, massive government subsidies to the country's
inefficient and technologically outdated industries are sure to
continue, while market reform and legitimate privatization will
undoubtedly be stalled.
Moreover, the privatization the bureaucrats actually al-
lowed has been a sort of cruel joke as the former managers
remain in control of industry and need only telephone Moscow
to obtain government subsidies provided by the nomenktatura.
Central planning was canceled, but the centralized bureaucratic
system is alive and well. Many large entities that have been
privatized enjoy state subsidies and monopoly power and lack
incentive to operate efficiently because they can more easily
devote resources to rent-seeking. Those government officials in
charge of the process are in many cases abusing their power in
order to effectuate wealth transfers to themselves and their
powerful supporters. Although nearly forty percent of all
Russian workers are now employed by privately owned busi-
nesses,67 bureaucrats and the privileged nomenklatura class
maintain control over and secure much of the profits from these
businesses. According to a recent Business Week article, "in-
creasingly powerful public-sector managers profit tremendously
from the sell-offs [of government businesses], often gaining
controlling stakes or at least veto power in their companies.
Some set up profitable businesses on the side, such as banks or
equipment suppliers."68  In addition, the Washington Post
recently reported that in most cases privatization has been
Margaret Shapiro, Russia's Premier Has Reformers Seeing Red, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 11, 1994, at A33, A38.
6Id. at A38.
" Dorinda Elliot & Michael Elliot, Boris is Finally a Russian, NEWSWEEK,
.Jan. 31, 1994, at 44, 45.
67 Galusska & Kranz, supra note 63, at 43.
Peter Galusska & Susan B. Garland, Russia: From.Shock Therapy to
Shock Absorbers, Bus. WK., Jan. 31, 1994, at 49.
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merely the "replace[ment of] government-owned enterprises
with joint stock companies controlled by the nomenklatura and
criminal mafias. 69  Obviously, this type of "sham privatiza-
tion" is not going to lead to the increased productivity and
efficiency that the Russian economy so desperately needs. In
order for Russia to move forward economically, the bureaucrats
must abandon their self-interest (or be bought off or over-
thrown) and make more legitimate efforts to move government-
owned industry into the hands of entrepreneurs.
B. BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OF THE PROCESS:
POLITICS AS USUAL
The question, then, is which of the other two possibilities -
complete bureaucratic control of the process or bargaining
between bureaucrats and consumers - best describes the
ongoing situation in Russia. It does not appear that the bureau-
crats gained complete control of the process of constitutional
formation. They did not exclude the consumers from the bar-
gaining table entirely and thus were unable to ignore consumer
interests completely. Evidence of this derives from the fact that
bureaucrats have not been able to implement organizational
-rules that are entirely in their best interests in terms of solving
the contracting problems between politicians and rent-seekers.
Although the new constitution failed to break the bureau-
crats' powerful hold over the government, it was not a total loss
for consumers. The constitution contains several of the provi-
sions described earlier that work to increase transaction costs
between special interest groups and politicians. For example,
the constitution provides for three separate and independent
branches of government - a legislature, an executive, and a
judiciary. 0 It also provides for an independent central bank
exclusively responsible for monetary emission. 1 In addition,
a complex system of checks and balances deters abuses of power
by any one of the three branches of government. 2 These pro-
69 Abraham Brumberg, Russian Reform Humbug, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
1994, at A23.
70 See CONST. OF THE RussIAN FED'N, chs. 4-7.
71 See id., ch. 3, arts. 75, 76.
72 For a detailed description of the relationships between the branches of
the new Russian government, see Framework or Frame-up? EcONOMIsT, Dec.
18, 1993, at 47.
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visions, as discussed previously, impede the efforts of rent-
seekers by increasing the number of people who need to be
reached (or bought) in order to obtain favorable legislation.
In addition to the structural impediments described above,
Chapters 1 and 2 of the constitution work to restrict rent-
seeking by guaranteeing that an impressive array of rights will
not be infringed upon by the government."3 The Russian gov-
ernment may choose to ignore these rights, but their mere
presence serves as limitations on legislative and executive
power and indicates consumer influence in the constitutional
reform process.
Moreover, the serious political unrest that accompanied the
transformation process makes it clear that something like a
constitutional moment is at least a possibility in Russia. This
possibility acts as a significant constraint on the degree of
freedom bureaucrats enjoy. In particular, they may be encour-
aged to act in order to increase the efficiency of the present
system, thereby reducing the perceived gap between potential
and actual income and delaying a constitutional moment that
could be dominated by consumers. The resulting larger share of
the rent-seeking pie at the expense of the politicians would not
be enough to compensate for the smaller size of the pie itself.
Consequently, the real issue is whether the bureaucracy is
capable of improving the economic performance of Russia, a
doubtful proposition both because the situation already may be
out of control and because of the limited skills of many bureau-
crats.
Notwithstanding the above concerns, the bureaucrats
themselves have been unwilling to promote full constitutional
change for two reasons. On the one hand, the role consumers
would likely play during the constitutional moment would be a
.threat to the bureaucrats' power. In addition, a confused
political situation without constitutional change deprives politi-
cians of their bargaining power, which is based on personal
credibility and expected length of stay in office, and thereby
favors the role of the bureaucrat, who is the only solid rock in
the storm.
73 See CONST. OF THE RUSSIAN FED'N, chs. 1 & 2.
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C. THE BARGAINNG GAME IN RUSSIA
The third possibility offers the best representation of the
situation in Russia. Neither the bureaucrats nor the consumers
could completely exclude the other from the bargaining table, or
ignore the other's influence. Each group takes the interests of
the other into account, at least to some extent.
Unfortunately, a variety of institutional factors have imped-
ed consumers' ability to strike a bargain with the bureaucrats
that would result in constitutional change and a reduction in
aggregate levels of bureaucratic waste caused by rent-seeking.
No mechanism was devised to effectuate side-payments from
consumers to bureaucrats because, as explained above, the
benefits flowing from the enactment of constitutional rules that
impede rent-seeking are future gains to be realized from in-
creases in productivity and aggregate social wealth. Conse-
quently, bureaucrats will be asked to make immediate sacrifices
in their freedom to bargain by accepting constitutional impedi-
ments to rent-seeking in exchange for promises of future com-
pensation from consumers.
One possible means of avoiding this bargaining trap is
through Western aid. Unfortunately, Western taxpayers do not
appear to be willing to permit their funds to be used to pay
bureaucrats to refrain from interfering with market processes or
to subsidize the organization of consumers into effective pres-
sure groups. What is needed is a means of packaging aid from
the West in order to accomplish this objective without appearing
to do so.
As Jan Winiecki observed in his innovative article on the
problems encountered in reforming Soviet-style economies, there
are two principal types of rents enjoyed by existing elites in
Russia. 4 First, and most obviously, are the kickbacks by
which managers and other members of the ruling elite divert
resources to others in exchange for private gains for themselves.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, are the payments that
members of the bureaucracy receive in exchange for making
appointments.
The expected loss of these rents by people in power is the
major obstacle to reform. 5 When an enterprise is privatized
74 Jan Winiecki, Why Economic Reforms Fail in the Soviet System - A
Property Rights-Based Approach, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 195 (1990).
75 Id. at 205.
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(legitimately) bureaucrats lose their powers of appointment, and
the people running the enterprise, even if they remain in con-
trol, lose the ability to obtain funds from kickbacks. Thus, both
types of rents disappear in the event of privatization.
Consistent with the bargaining framework advanced here,
one means of resolving this dilemma is to have entrepreneurs
pay the apparatchiks for the right to set up private firms.
Unfortunately, the existing legal structure in Russia strongly
discourages such solutions. Receipt of a payment in exchange
for permission to set up a private firm would constitute a bribe
under Russian law - a criminal act." By contrast, rent ex-
traction in appointments is either perfectly legal or, at worst, in
the "grey area" between the improper and the criminal.77
Consistent with this bargaining approach, it would be far better
if bribes to accomplish privatization were decriminalized, even
encouraged, while appointments to managerial posts within
industrial firms by bureaucrats were criminalized. It is not
clear, however, how such a change could be accomplished.
The only viable means of solving the contracting problems
that impede reform is to keep the bureaucrats in office and
obtain a promise from them that they will refrain from interfer-
ing with the operation of the markets. Unfortunately, the
bureaucrats have incentives to act opportunistically in order to
enhance their power by creating crises that may only be re-
solved by a powerful state which, in turn, would be anchored on
a powerful and centralized civil service. Thus the dramatic rise
in criminal activity in general, and mafia-related violence in
particular, is actually consistent with the self-interests of
Russia's politicians and bureaucrats in that these events in-
crease the public's demand for a powerful state.
The demise of Gorbachev, and Yeltsin's subsequent rise to
power, can be seen as a textbook example of the bargaining
model described in this paper. As Tatyana Tolstaya so cogently
observed, as long as Gorbachev was in power as head of the
Communist party, Yeltsin's role as President of Russia was
symbolic at best and meaningless at worst.78  Until
Gorbachev's demise, Yeltsin was just another "toy 'president"'
79
of the other republics within the former Soviet Union, and the
7 6 Id. at 206.
77 Id.
7' Tatyana Tolstaya, Boris the First, N.Y. REV. BooKs, June 23, 1994, at 3.
79 Id. at 4.
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presidents of the other republics realized significant gains from
overthrowing Gorbachev. In doing so, they obtained real power:
They finally had the prospect of unlimited rule at
home. They wouldn't have to account to 'Moscow' or
crawl on their bellies to send tithes: rugs, diamonds,
cognac, money, porcelain vases of human height with
portraits of the Great Russian Boss .... Yeltsin would
have to share with his fellow bandits, especially since
this would allow him to seem a great democrat, and
pronounce those sweet words, sovereignty, indepen-
dence, equal rights.80
Thus, the demise of the former Soviet Union can be attrib-
uted to Yeltsin's quest for power; he traded an imperial empire
for greater power to the local rulers in their own country. His
bargaining partners were power brokers, such as Georgia's
Edward Shevarnadze, who stood to gain significant power and
autonomy in their newly independent states. The twin promises
of economic reform and democracy were mere smoke screens to
disguise the power grab. Once Yeltsin achieved his goal of
becoming President of Russia, the apparatchiks and bureaucrats
realized there were powerful incentives to resist change."'
These same apparatchiks and bureaucrats are now a signifi-
cant restraint on Yeltsin, for they are likely to revolt if he places
their dominance in jeopardy by changing the command and
control nature of Russia's economic system.8" Examples of
such changes include the current system of side payments -
usually in the form of goods for which there is a shortage and a
high black market price - and kickbacks from managers of
industrial firms to bureaucrats and apparatchiks-83  Also
80 Id.
81 This did not occur earlier because before Gorbachev there had never
been a serious threat of constitutional change, and thus no need for previous
leaders to trade formal imperial power for substantial local power.
Gorbachev consequently gave in to pressures for constitutional change
both because he hoped to trade an increasingly shaky absolute power (due to
the economic crisis and the increasingly authoritative nomenklatura) for
greater power in a less totalitarian empire, and because of the severe financial
economic crisis in the U.S.S.R.
82Winiecki, supra note 74, at 202.
8 Id. at 199.
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threatened is the receipt of private benefits by the managers of
inefficient, state-supported enterprises when they delegate
workers from auxiliary factory divisions to build coun-
try houses at sharply reduced prices, to build one-of-a-
kind furniture for the apartment of a superior on the
same basis, etc. The relative unimportance of efficiency
allows managers to absorb, without being held account-
able, the costs of these kickback activities. Leakage of
wealth thus takes place not only through the losses
incurred and gains foregone by incompetent managers,
but also because of time and effort spent on rent seek-
ing activities.'
Last, but not least, existing bureaucrats have strong incen-
tives to resist change because it might eliminate one or more
layers of the bureaucracy. Such reform would not only harm
the bureaucrats, whose employment would be terminated, but
also the higher level apparatchiks because they would be able to
command fewer rents in exchange for making such appoint-
ments."5 More generally, the apparatchiks would most strong-
ly resist attempts to move Russian society toward a market-
based meritocracy, since such a change would undermine the
power of the apparatchiks to make appointments. This is why
the nomenklatura has never been abolished for managerial
posts in the Russian economy."6 Ironically, since it is in indus-
try that there are the best opportunities for kickbacks, it is
there that the existing elites most strongly resist moving to a
market-based system which would threaten the nomenklatura.
By contrast, in agriculture, where there are fewer opportunities
for the apparatchiks to obtain rents from the nomenklatura they
appoint, the resistance to market forces has been less intense.
-Thus, the history of Russia (and many Eastern European
economies) "shows some partly successful reforms of state
agriculture .... To date no reforms of state industry, based on
general parameters, accountability, or merit, have been success-
ful.1
'87
84 Id. at 200.
85 Id.
8 6 Id. at 202.
87 Id.
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CONCLUSION
As Douglass North observed, the persistent tension between
the organizational structure of a government that maximizes
the income of its ruler (and the ruler's supporters), and an
efficient system that reduces transaction costs and encourages
economic growth, is the "root cause of the failure of societies to
experience sustained economic growth."88 The way this tension
between the interests of the ruler and the interests of the
governed is resolved in Russia over the next few years will
determine the economic future of that country. Of particular
importance is whether the leaders can arrive at a bargaining
*solution with consumers that allows both sides to enjoy the
benefits from trade that accrue as a result of a reduction in
aggregate levels of rent-seeking. It is by no means clear they
will be able to do this.
Consistent with basic principles of path-dependence, it is
inevitable that the future of reform in Russia will be determined
by the initial conditions under which the collapse of the Soviet
Union occurred. In particular, the absence of a meaningful
external force to remove the stranglehold exerted by preexisting
interest groups strongly suggests that the dramatic and effective
economic reforms that took place in post-War Germany and
Japan will not be seen in Russia. The open question, of course,
concerns possible scenarios for the future. If the bureaucrats
continue to feel threatened and are not successfully bought off,
either by outside powers or by internal interests, the situation
in Russia will continue to worsen. However, if a mechanism can
be designed for paying off the bureaucrats, the situation will
significantly improve. How much improvement will depend on
the nature of the bargain struck with the bureaucrats and the
price at which it is reached.
Thus, until means can be devised for paying off Russian
bureaucrats or for removing them from pdwer entirely (an
unlikely prospect), real reform is impossible. To paraphrase
Tatyana Tolstaya, in the Russian tradition, we feel sorry for the
loser - Russia.89
North, supra note 46, at 253.
8 9Tolstaya, supra note 78, at 7.
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